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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The growth of Internet telephony or Voice over Internet Protocol 
(“VoIP”) services has led to questions by policymakers and 
legislators over the regulation of VoIP.1 In this paper, we consider 
the extent to which VoIP services are protected from an E.U./U.S. 
perspective and the concerns arising from the current legislative 
framework, mainly from a privacy perspective. This paper is divided 
into three parts. Part II considers VoIP services in general. Part III 
examines the European framework and in particular, the current 
categorization of VoIP services before considering the privacy 
perspective, taking into account the Directive on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications 2002/58/EC (“DPEC”)2 and the general 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (“DPD”).3 Part IV considers the 
U.S. framework in protecting the privacy of communications, 
asserting that the federal courts and legislatures should act to 
explicitly protect VoIP oral Internet communications. Part V will 
conclude by discussing the principal areas that still need to be 
addressed. 
 
 1. See David Bach & Jonathan Sallet, The Challenges of Classification: 
Emerging VOIP Regulation in Europe and the United States, FIRST MONDAY, June 
14, 2005, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_7/bach/ (supplying a starting 
point into the classification of VoIP services). Bach and Sallet address the need for 
regulation and different methods that could be used, as well as providing an 
analysis of the issues surrounding the different methods of regulation available. 
 2. See Council Directive 2002/58, Concerning the Processing of Personal 
Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 
O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC) [hereinafter DPEC] (addressing the European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union’s concerns with protecting the privacy of 
personal data across borders). 
 3. See Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter DPD] (addressing the processing, protection, and 
free movement of personal data). 
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II.  WHAT IS VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL? 
In its broadest definition, VoIP can be described as the 
“conveyance of voice, fax and related services partially or wholly 
over packet-switched IP-based networks, including peer-to-peer 
VoIP services and VoIP services connected to PSTN.”4 According to 
the latest estimate, more than 18.7 million people worldwide were 
using retail VoIP services by the end of 2005.5 This figure is 
increased to nearly twenty-four million when PC-based VoIP 
services such as Skype are included.6 While these figures indicate a 
rising trend in the take-up of VoIP services by users, the question 
arises on the main issues that dominate VoIP services and its 
regulation within Europe and the United States. For the purposes of 
this paper, we shall consider the narrow interpretation of VoIP to 
refer to voice traffic carried over Internet Protocal (“IP”) based 
broadband Internet networks. 
This section presents a broad overview of the technology involved 
in both Internet voice and data transactions. It discusses, in a non-
technical manner, how VoIP transmits voice communications over 
the Internet. 
VoIP is a technology by which oral communications can be 
transferred from circuit-switched networks to or over IP networks, 
and vice versa.7 VoIP transforms standard oral telephone signals into 
 
 4. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
Directorate For Science, Technology and Industry Committee For Information, 
Computer And Communications Policy, Working Party on Telecommunications 
and Information Services Policies, Policy Considerations of VOIP, 4 (March 21, 
2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/36316212.pdf. 
 5. Point Topic, Retail VoIP Subscribers Increase by 83% During 2005, 
August 16, 2006, http://www.point-
topic.com/content/dslanalysis/BBAVoipana060816.htm. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Peter Grant, Ready for Prime Time: A New Internet-Based Phone 
Technology has an Un-Catchy Acronym: VoIP, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2004, at R7 
(describing the emergence of VoIP and providing an overview of the emerging 
market for VoIP services). Growth projections for VoIP vary widely, but the Wall 
Street Journal reported that “[b]y the end of this year [2004], about 20% of the new 
phones being shipped to U.S. businesses will use VOIP technology, according to 
Yankee Group, a technology consulting firm based in Boston. By 2007 that figure 
should exceed 50%, and eventually almost all of the new phones shipped will use 
VoIP, Yankee Group predicts.” Id. 
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compressed data packets that are sent over the Internet using Internet 
Protocol.8 The audio signal at this point is captured in an analog 
format either by way of a microphone or received from a line input 
device,9 and converted to a digital representation at the audio input 
device.10 The resulting digital samples are copied into a memory 
buffer in blocks of frame length.11  Here, a silence detector decides 
whether the block is silence or a portion of speech, and removes the 
silent blocks to speed transmission of the digital data.12 Prior to 
transmission over the Internet, the block itself is written to a socket. 
Once this is completed, the communication is transmitted to another 
VoIP terminal. This terminal parses the header information and the 
block of audio is decoded applying the same codec and the samples 
written into a buffer.13 Once this step is complete, the block of 
samples is copied from the buffer to the audio output device.14 The 
audio output device makes the digital to analog conversion and 
outputs the signal.15 VoIP can be used with either a telephone or a PC 
as the user terminal.16 This allows different modes of operation: PC 
to PC, PC to telephone, telephone to PC and telephone to telephone 
 
 8. See generally UYLESS BLACK, VOICE OVER IP 1 (1995) (introducing the 
basic terms and concepts of Internet Protocol and VoIP). 
 9.  See Jon-Olov Vant, IP Telephony: Mobility and Security 15 (May 2005) 
(doctoral thesis in teleinformatics, Stockholm, Sweden) (describing the means of 
capturing audio data at its source and the process by which it is transferred onto a 
packet based network); see, e.g., TELECOMM. STANDARDIZATION SECTOR OF ITU 
[ITU-T], INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, ITU-T RECOMMENDATION H.225.0, CALL 
SIGNALLING PROTOCOLS AND MEDIA STREAM PACKETIZATION FOR PACKET BASED 
MULTIMEDIA COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 67–69 (1998) (providing a technical 
description of how multicast services such as interactive audio and video are 
delivered via a packet based network). 
 10. Vant, supra note 9, at 16. 
 11. Id. at 16–17. 
 12.  Id. at 17. 
 13. See generally, Philip Carden, Building Voice over IP, NETWORK 
COMPUTING, May 8, 2000 (describing the different technologies a home or 
business could use in an effort to switch over from traditional phone systems to a 
VoIP phone system). 
 14.  See generally Darrin Woods, Connecting to the Voice World, NETWORK 
COMPUTING, April 17, 2000 (explaining the various ways to switch from standard 
PBX telephony to newer VoIP telephony). 
 15. Vant, supra note 9, at 20. 
 16. See Rachael King, Home of the Future, TELEPHONY, June 6, 2005, at 10 
(predicting that consumers will begin replacing their cordless telephones with 
telephone handsets capable of handling VoIP services). 
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(via the Internet). All VoIP protocols are application layer 
protocols.17 
For some time, people have been aware of the potential for 
wiretapping, but the public perceives such actions to be limited to 
corporate espionage and criminal activities.18 Eavesdropping over the 
switched telephone network requires physical access to the telephone 
line and access to some type of hardware device that may or may not 
be very sophisticated.19 Wiretapping dangers increase considerably in 
the VoIP world. The equipment or software needed is much more 
sophisticated, but well within the reach of a sixteen-year old hacker 
that has access to e-Bay or the Web.  Data sniffing tools20 are readily 
 
 17.  See BLACK, supra note 8, at 23–24 (explaining that the application layer is 
the seventh layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Model and provides 
services for end-user applications such as file transfers, e-mail, and other network 
software services). The application layer is defined within the OSI Model and 
utilizes TCP/IP protocols, which are an industry standard group of protocols 
through which computers find, communicate, and access one another over a 
transmission medium. Id. at 41–51. The protocol group is implemented in the form 
of a software package known as a TCP/IP stack, which splits the transmission into 
a number of discrete tasks. Id. Each layer corresponds to a different form of 
communication, and the TCP/IP architecture utilizes four layers; application, 
transport, Internet, and the physical layer. Id. The transmission of voice 
communications over the Internet initiates with data being sent from the 
application layer down the stack to physical layer, where it is then transmitted to 
the receiver and ascends the stack in reverse order, ending at the application layer. 
Id. at 23–24. 
 18.  See Jay Fitzgerald, Team to Tie Net Phone Hackers; Industry Aims to Stop 
Scams Before They Start, BOSTON HERALD, April 26, 2005, at 31 (reporting that 
businesses are starting up a national organization to develop security measures 
which will prevent VoIP eavesdropping before “hackers inevitably turn their 
attention to the growing VoIP”). 
 19. See K. Percy & M. Hommer, Tips From the Trenches on VoIP, NETWORK 
WORLD, Jan. 27, 2003, at 48 (recognizing that eavesdropping on standard PBX 
phone lines requires physical access to the phone system’s hardware or phone lines 
themselves). Percy and Hommer describe eavesdropping on a VoIP network as 
“the most dreaded form of deviant behavior,” recommending that VoIP users take 
the proper precautions to prevent the behavior. Id. VoIP vendors and equipment 
providers are taking the appropriate steps to prevent this behavior by adding 
security features to their offerings. Id. 
 20. See P.J. Bruening & M. Stephen, Spyware: Technologies, Issues, and 
Policy Proposals, 7 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3–5 (2004) (explaining how data sniffing 
tools, such as cookie technology, spyware, and adware, pose a threat to computer 
security). Data sniffing tools are used primarily to steal or transmit end-user data 
from an end-users machines with or without their knowledge. Id. Advertisers can 
use these tools to identify what sites end-users have visited and deliver targeted ads 
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available and these tools will soon be enhanced to become aware of 
the new VoIP protocols, broadening access to wiretapping tools.21 
While in an office environment VoIP traffic travels over a data 
network that is used by all of the regular users of the corporate LAN 
(local area network), any or all of the conversations traversing a 
network could theoretically be compromised by anyone with a 
regular connection on the network.22 Consequently, VoIP packets 
could be identified and stored for re-assembly to be played back at a 
later time.23 The idea that only Internet traffic is at risk is simply 
wrong.24 Privacy for oral traffic could be vastly enhanced by the use 
of encryption.25 Most corporate and home networks, however, do not 
encrypt VoIP calls.26 
 
to the end-user’s computer. Id. For example, if a user visits a Florida cruise site 
followed by a later visit to a golfing site, advertisers using data sniffing tools will 
serve advertisements to the end-user’s computer about golf course vacations in 
Florida. 
 21.  See Scumware.biz Educates About Dangers of Adware/Scumware, 5 
COMPUTER SECURITY UPDATE 2 (Feb. 2004) (describing one such tool, Scumware, 
that allows publishers to monitor individuals’ browsing activity). 
 22. See Dale J. Long, The Lazy Person’s Guide to Voice Telephony—Part II, 
CHIPS MAGAZINE, Spring 2004, at 43–44 (recognizing that attempts to intercept 
communications are likely to grow with the widespread adoption of wireless 
network technologies). 
 23.  See Amie J. Singer, Cost-Effectiveness, Security Concerns at Heart of 
Uncertainty: Debate Over Voice-Over Internet Protocol Benefits, SAN DIEGO BUS. 
J., Dec. 17, 2001. 
 24.  See Ian Shepherd, VoIP The Maturity of Internet Telephony Technology 
Opens Up Network Safety Concerns Voice Over IP: Finding a Balance Between 
Flexible Access and Risk of External Attack, COMPUTER WKLY, Apr. 19, 2005, at 
34. 
 25.  See Philip Bednarz, Communications Design Conference, Security 
Considerations at Forefront of VoIP Design, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, 
Sept. 23, 2002, at 63 (noting that “data encryption is the best defense against 
eavesdropping”). The author, however, acknowledges that encryption and 
decryption can delay packets, causing problems with two-way conversations if the 
overall latency of a VoIP call is greater than approximately 250 milliseconds. Id. 
 26.  See Yumi Nishiyama, Collective Action in a Complex Environment: The 
Case Study of Network Security in Telecom/IT Convergence 3, 15–16 (Apr. 24, 
2003) (unpublished Master's thesis, Georgetown University) (on file with author) 
(explaining that VoIP is a solid technology; however, it requires government 
regulation to ensure a certain level of product reliability and safety for the 
consumer). Up until today, the users have seen security issues in the data and voice 
worlds as completely separate. With the advent of VoIP, users are now exposed to 
the risks of sending data over the Internet while simultaneously having the 
expectation that telephone conversations are between the parties involved. Id. at 1, 
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One of the attractive features provided by VoIP is the ability to 
locate intelligence at various points in the network. Gatekeeper or 
call-manager type devices, which authenticate users and establish 
connections,27 can physically reside on any server28 on the network. 
This is really a two-edged sword. Logging information about user 
calls may be useful for billing or tracking purposes, but these logs 
can also become targets for hackers. If this type of information 
becomes compromised, it can create serious concerns for 
organizations or individuals.29 Unfortunately, the home user and the 
majority of corporate users are unaware of any of these 
vulnerabilities when they purchase or use VoIP technology.30 
 
8. VoIP is vulnerable because convergent technologies lead to weakness from 
multiple points. Id. at 11, 34. In addition, VoIP must address the security holes in 
cell phones that arise from the transport mechanisms used when mobile phones are 
used. See Martius Miettinen, IT-Security in the Automobile Domain, 6 (2003), 
available at  
http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/mjmietti/seminaariS03/automobilesecurity.pdf. 
  Adjoining these problems is the reality that cell tracker tools have evolved 
and people can eavesdrop with much greater ease on cellular transmission. Id. 
Also, hackers can intercept data with greater ease than before when the data travels 
in soft zones (unprotected) between legitimate users and cell towers. Id. Thus, 
transmitting information in digital form raises new vulnerabilities and digital 
devices can be used for fiscal and/or privacy violations. Id. at 17, 23. As the VoIP 
systems run on vulnerable software, they must contend with all of these possible 
holes. 
 27. See Michele Rosen, The Maturing of the Internet Telephony Market—
Market is Maturing—Internet/Web/Online Service Information, ENT, Mar. 18, 
1998, at 48 (stating that a gatekeeper is an optional component of an H.323 
enabled network that provides central management and control services). H.323 is 
a technical standard that defines protocols which enable VoIP companies to create 
interoperable Internet telephony solutions. Id. Gatekeepers usually deliver the 
following in relation to VoIP services: (1) address translation; (2) bandwidth 
management; and (3) routing functionality. Id. 
 28.  See Oxford English Dictionary Online, Server (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) 
(“In a network, any program which manages shared access to a centralized 
resource or service; an (often dedicated) device on which such a program is run.”). 
 29.  See Edwin Mier et al., VoIP Security Wares; Breaking Through IP 
Telephony, NETWORK WORLD, May 24, 2004, at 84–88. 
 30.  See Fitzgerald, supra note 18 (reporting that many firms are developing 
security measures to protect the growing sector of VoIP services against the next 
wave of computer hackers). See generally Mike Lee, Beware! Bugs Can Attack Net 
Phones; They May be Cheap But They Are Also Vulnerable to Hackers, Say 
Experts, Who Advise Installing Anti-Virus Patches, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), 
Aug. 22, 2004 (explaining that VoIP phones are extremely vulnerable to hackers 
because hackers need no specialized equipment to tap into Internet phones). 
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III.  EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF VOIP SERVICES 
A.  NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
At a European level, the protection of VoIP services is broadly 
covered under the New Regulatory Framework (“NRF”) for 
electronic communications, which was adopted in April 2002 and 
came into effect on July 2003. The NRF was introduced after a 
Commission’s Communication Review back in 199931 which was 
principally concerned with reforming the telecommunications sector. 
The NRF is comprised of five Directives: the Framework Directive 
2002/21/EC,32 Authorisation Directive 2002/20/EC,33 Access and 
Interconnection Directive 2002/19/EC,34 Universal Service Directive 
2002/22/EC,35 and the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications 2002/58/EC.36 
The Framework Directive sets out the main principles and 
objectives underpinning the E.U. regulatory policy on the provision 
of electronic communications services and networks, including the 
role of the National Regulator Authority (“NRA”).37 The Access and 
Interconnection Directive deals with the harmonization of the linking 
of networks between operators of public communications services.38 
 
 31. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
Towards a New Framework for Electronic Communications Infrastructure and 
Associated Services: The 1999 Communications Review, COM (1999) 539 (Nov. 
10, 1999). 
 32. Council Directive 2002/21, On a Common Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33 (EC) 
[hereinafter Framework Directive 2002/21]. 
 33. Council Directive 2002/20, On the Authorisation of Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 21 (EC). 
 34. Council Directive 2002/19, On Access to, and Interconnection of, 
Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 
7 (EC) [hereinafter Access Directive 2002/19]. 
 35. Council Directive 2002/22, On Universal Service and Users’ Rights 
Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 
51 (EC) [hereinafter Universal Service Directive 2002/22]. 
 36. DPEC, supra note 2. 
 37. Framework Directive 2002/21, supra note 32. 
 38. Access Directive 2002/19, supra note 34. 
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The Universal Services Directive is important because it principally 
deals with the minimum set of services to be made available to end-
users including Publicly Available Telecommunications Services 
(“PATS”),39 network integrity, directory enquiry services, public 
payphones and special measures for disabled users.40 The 
Authorisation Directive establishes a legal framework for Member 
States on general authorization41 and applies to the authorization of 
all public and private electronic communications networks42 and 
electronic communications services.43  By covering “all electronic 
communications networks and services” whether provided publicly 
or not, the Directive applies to both categories of providers so that 
they can “benefit from objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and 
proportionate rights, conditions and procedures.” 44 
 
 39. See infra notes 56–67 and accompanying text. 
 40. See European Commission, Universal Service, 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/todays_framework/universa
l_service/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2006) (explaining that “universal 
service” is “a safety net to ensure that a set of basic telecommunications services 
would always be available at a determined quality and affordable price, even if the 
market would not provide it”). 
 41. See European Commission, Regulating Market Access, 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/todays_framework/market_
access/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2006). 
 42. Framework Directive 2002/21, supra note 32, art. 2(a) (defining an 
“‘electronic communications network’” as “transmission systems and, where 
applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the 
conveyance of signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic 
means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit and packet-switched, including 
Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent 
that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio 
and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type 
of information  conveyed . . .”). 
 43. Id. art. (2)(c) (defining an “‘electronic communications service’” as “a 
service normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the 
conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks, including 
telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used for 
broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or exercising editorial control over, 
content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; it 
does not include information society services, as defined in Article 1 of Directive 
98/34/EC, which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on 
electronic communications networks . . .”). 
 44. Access Directive 2002/19, supra note 34, Recital 4. 
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In 2004, the Analysys Report45 commissioned by the European 
Commission, was published which considered the subject of VoIP 
services. Amongst the issues discussed, the report examined the 
regulation, structure of the telecoms market and current technology 
used.46 In particular, the report authors took the view that the 
following issues needed to be addressed. Namely, the current 
categorization of VoIP as PATS, location independence, emergency 
access, and network integrity.47 Given the scope of this paper, the 
discussion will focus on the current categorization of VoIP from a 
U.S. and European perspective. 
B.  CLASSIFICATION OF VOIP PROVIDERS 
In brief, the regulation of VoIP in Europe is slightly complex48 
because there is no consensus over the categorization of VoIP 
services. The Commission takes a “light touch” approach to VoIP 
regulation. Whether VoIP service is regulated would depend on 
whether a VoIP service is considered as an electronic communication 
service (“ECS”) or a PATS. An ECS is defined under Art. 2(c) of the 
Framework Directive as a “service normally provided for 
remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of 
signals on electronic communications networks.”49 Therefore, a VoIP 
service that provided a product such as a software program to be run 
on a personal computer with no ongoing provision of service would 
fall outside the scope of the E.U. regulatory framework.50 A PATS is 
 
 45. See European Commission, Final Report for the European Commission: IP 
Voice and Associated Convergent Voices, (Jan. 28, 2004) (prepared by Analysys), 
available at 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/info_centre/studies_ext
_consult/ip_voice/401_28_ip_voice_and_associated_convergent_services.pdf. 
 46. Id. at i–iii. 
 47. Id. at iii. 
 48. See Bach & Sallet, supra note 1; Ian Walden, European Union 
Communications Law, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND REGULATION 107 (Ian 
Walden & John Angel eds., 2d ed. 2005); Sirge J.H. Gijrath. Voiding the 
Regulation or Regulating the Void? Voice Over Internet Protocol and Voice Over 
Broadband in the Netherlands, 12 COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. REV. 150, 150–155 
(2006); Katrina Dick, The Emergence and Regulation of VoIP, 10 COMPUTER & 
TELECOMM. L. REV. 157, 157–59 (2004). 
 49. Framework Directive 2002/21, supra note 32, art. 2(c). 
 50. See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on the 
Treatment of Voice Over Internet Protocol Under the EU Regulatory Framework § 
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defined under Art. 2(c) of the Universal Directive as “a service 
available to the public for originating and receiving national and 
international calls and access to emergency services through a 
number or numbers in a national or international telephone 
numbering plan.”51 
The classification of a VoIP provider as PATS means that the 
criteria laid down under the Universal Services Directive would 
apply.52 However, not all VoIP providers would be classified as 
PATS because some providers may not give access to emergency 
services as required under the definition. Therefore, the 
categorization of VoIP providers as PATS is not wholly conclusive. 
In response to a consultation paper on the treatment of voice over 
internet protocol53 by the European Commission, the European 
Internet Service Providers Association (“EuroISPA”) made known 
their view the need for legal certainty regarding the rights and 
obligation of the VoIP service providers.54 In particular, they added 
that “VoIP providers should not be classed as a PATS provider on 
the basis of certain technical parameters.”55 They took the view that 
“VoIP provider[s] should be categorized as a PATS provider if its 
service is assessed from the demand side (i.e. the customer) as a 
direct substitute for their traditional voice telephony service.”56 
Arguably, the demand for VoIP services has not reached the point 
where it has replaced the traditional telephony service,57 but the lack 
 
3 (June 14, 2004) (prepared by Information Society Directorate-General), 
available at 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/info_centre/commiss_s
erv_doc/406_14_voip_consult_paper_v2_1.pdf. 
 51. Universal Service Directive 2002/22, supra note 35, art. 2(c). 
 52. Id. 
 53. European Commission, supra note 50. 
 54. See European Internet Services Providers Association [EuroISPA], DG 
INFSO Information and Consultation Document: The Treatment of Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) under the EU Regulatory Framework: Response from 
EuroISPA 2 (2004), available at  
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/info_centre/public_con
sult/voip/eispa.pdf (arguing that robust implementation of the regulatory 
framework will encourage innovation and new entrants into the market). 
 55. Id. at 2. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Olli Mattila, Background for Discussions at ERG Meeting 17.46.04, 
Voice over IP (VoIP) – Background and Regulatory Aspects, available at 
http://erg.eu.int/doc/publications/consult_accounting_sep/erg_0422_voip_discussi
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of legal certainty in this area does raise significant questions about 
the extent to which VoIP providers should provide access to 
emergency services and the like. 
In a recent decision by the Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority,58 Ficora held that TeliaSonera VoIP (Sonera Puhekaista) 
service should be classified as a PATS service on the basis that it 
was available to the public, users originate and receive national and 
international calls, there was access to emergency services, and the 
service was available through the Finnish numbering plan.59 The 
TeliaSonera’s VoIP Service was offered only to their broadband 
users and was offered as a substitute for pubic switched telephone 
network (“PSTN”) connection. The implication arising from the 
Ficora’s decision was that the TeliaSonera VoIP Service had to 
comply with the obligations set for PATS laid down under the 
Finnish regulations. These included making available to their users, 
access to the international calls using the access code 00, availability 
to users to access the emergency call number 112 and other special 
emergency number free of charge, call barring service at the request 
of the user free of charge, and the provision of itemized bills free of 
charge to the user.60 
The United Kingdom’s NRF, Ofcom has used the same criterion 
as the Universal Services Directive by holding the view that a 
provider qualifies as a PATS if all the following criteria are satisfied. 
Namely, a provider would need to show that it was “a service 
available to the public for originating and receiving national and 
international calls and provided access to emergency services 
through a number or numbers in a national or international telephone 
numbering plan.”61 What this means is that a VoIP provider based in 
 
on_note.ppt (last visited Aug. 8, 2006) (predicting that the expansion of broadband 
internet access is likely to accelerate the use of VoIP services). In the last 
presentation by Mattila on VoIP market trends, it was estimated in September 2003 
that there were less than 200,000 VoIP users worldwide and less than 20,000 VoIP 
users in Europe. Id. 
 58. Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority, Decision of the Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority on Compliance with Law of the Sonera 
Puhekaista Service (Oct. 29, 2003), 
http://www.ficora.fi/englanti/document/SoneraPuhekaista.pdf. 
 59. Id. at 10. 
 60. Id. at 11–12. 
 61. Ofcom, Office of Communications, Regulation of VoIP Services 95 (2006), 
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the United Kingdom, which does not meet all the criteria described 
above would not be considered as PATS.62 
Whilst the criterion to qualify as PATS is clear, it is unclear what 
the obligations are for VoIP providers that do not qualify for PATS 
status. Certainly, such non-PATS providers, such as peer-to-peer 
VoIP providers, would not have to fulfill the obligations as required 
under the Universal Services Directive; however, some VoIP 
providers may constitute an ECS as defined under the Framework 
Directive or corresponding national legislation and therefore will be 
required to comply with the obligations laid down under the NRF.63 
More specifically, a provider would have to adhere to the 
Authorisation Directive because it applies to ECS and the DPEC.64 
The latter protects the privacy of communications in the electronic 
communications sector. The DPEC replaces the Telecommunications 
Directive 97/66/EC65 by dealing with the processing of personal data 
in the context of the electronic communications sector. It 
complements the general DPD,66 which regulates the processing of 
personal data for non-public communications, by dealing with the 
regulation of personal data in the context of the electronic 
communications sector. For a VoIP provider, they would, as with 
any other organization or individual that collected personal 
information, be required to adhere with the general DPD67 or 
corresponding national legislation. The DPD was passed to 
harmonize the data protection laws within the European Union68 and 
 
available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/voipregulation/voipregulation.pdf. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Framework Directive 2002/21, supra note 32, art. 2(c) (defining electronic 
communications service as “a service normally provided for remuneration which 
consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic 
communications networks”). 
 64. DPEC, supra note 2. 
 65. Council Directive 97/66, Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and 
the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector, 1997 O.J. (L 24) 1 
(EC). 
 66. DPD, supra note 3. 
 67. DPEC, supra note 2. 
 68. For a background history into data protection laws in Europe, see LEE A. 
BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND 
LIMITS (2002); COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF 
PRIVACY: POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2003); and Andrew 
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imposes certain obligations on organizations or individuals (“data 
controllers”)69 that process personal information to comply inter alia 
with the data protection principles as laid down under Art. 6 of the 
DPD or its corresponding national laws. 
Art. 6 requires that personal data must be: 
(a) processed fairly and lawfully; 
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes 
and not further processed in a way incompatible with 
those purposes. Further processing of data for historical, 
statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as 
incompatible provided that Member States provide 
appropriate safeguards; 
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they are collected and/or further 
processed; 
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every 
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which 
are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the 
purposes for which they were collected or for which they 
are further processed, are erased or rectified; 
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data 
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes 
for which the data were collected or for which they are 
further processed. Member States shall lay down 
appropriate safeguards for personal data stored for longer 
periods for historical, statistical or scientific use.70 
 
Charlesworth, Information Privacy Law in the European Union: E Pluribus Unum 
or Ex Uno Plures, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 931 (2003). 
 69. DPD, supra note 3, art. 2(d) (defining “data controllers” as “the natural or 
legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly 
with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data 
”). 
 70. Id. art. 6. 
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All the Member States of the European Union have corresponding 
provisions to Art. 6 of the DPD.71 Individuals whose personal 
information is collected by the data controllers are entitled to a right 
to know what information is held about them, including information 
on the purposes of such processing and recipients or categories of 
recipients of such data.72 Furthermore, data controllers are required to 
“implement appropriate technical and organizational measures” to 
ensure confidentiality and security with regard to the processing of 
personal data.73 For the VoIP provider, the privacy of 
communications is important for users and the DPD places 
obligations on anybody that collects personal information to take 
technical and organizational security measures that are appropriate to 
the risks presented by the processing. Subject to the exemption under 
Art. 23(2) of the DPD,74 any breach resulting from an unlawful 
processing of personal data enables the user to receive some form of 
compensation .75 As alluded to earlier, the DPD is supplemented by 
the DPEC.76 
C.  APPLICATION OF THE DIRECTIVE ON PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS 
The question that arises is what provisions under DPEC, if any, 
apply to VoIP providers? First, the DPEC applies to “the processing 
of personal data in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services in public 
communications networks in the Community.”77 Therefore, private 
networks are excluded within the remit of the DPEC.78 Although 
 
 71. See European Commission, First Report on the Implementation of the Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC, COM (2003) 265 final (May 15, 2003), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/lawreport/report_en.htm. See 
generally, Privacy in Research Ethics & Law [PRIVIREAL], Data Protection – 
Countries, available at http://www.privireal.org/content/dp/countries.php. 
 72. DPD, supra note 3, art. 10. 
 73. Id. art. 17(1). 
 74. See id. art. 23(2) (“The controller may be exempted from this liability 
[under the DPD], in whole or in part, if he proves that he is not responsible for the 
event giving rise to the damage.”). 
 75. See id. art. 23(1). 
 76. See DPEC, supra note 2. 
 77. Id. art. 3(1) (emphasis added). 
 78. See Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
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there have been no legal cases in Europe on this, it could be argued 
that peer-to-peer VoIP service that are not provided over a public 
network but through an intranet system could fall outside the scope 
of the DPEC. Although the DPEC would not apply under the 
example given, the general DPD would continue to apply.79 The 
distinction, however, drawn under the DPEC between private and 
public networks is unfortunate and the Art. 29 Working Party80—an 
advisory body set up under the DPD to inter alia examine data 
protection issues, and provide opinions and make recommendations 
relating to data protection matters within the European Union—has 
not been slow to respond: 
This is regrettable because private networks are gaining an 
increasing importance in every day life and communications 
of citizens, for example in the context of their work, and the 
risks to privacy that such networks are raising are accordingly 
increasing and becoming more specific (e.g. monitoring of 
employee behaviour by means of traffic data, lack of 
confidentiality of communications).81 
For VoIP providers that do provide a service over a publicly 
available electronic communications service, the following 
provisions under DPEC would apply:  
 
Processing of Personal Data [Data Protection Working Party], Opinion 7/2000 on 
the European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection 
of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector of 12 July 2000 COM (2000) 
385, (Nov. 2, 2000)  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2000/wp36en.pdf. 
 79. See id. at 3; see also DPD, supra note 3, art. 3 (setting forth the broad scope 
of the DPD which covers “the processing of personal data wholly or partly by 
automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of 
personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a 
filing system”). 
 80. See DPD, supra note 3, arts. 29, 30 (detailing the role of the Working Party 
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data). 
The roles include examining questions about national measures adopted under the 
DPD, giving opinions on level of protection in member countries and third-party 
countries, and making  “recommendations on all matters relating to the protection 
of persons with regard to the processing of personal data in the Community”). 
 81. Data Protection Working Party, supra note 78, at 3. 
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1.  Article 5 on the Confidentiality of Communications 
Member States of the European Union are required to prohibit the 
“listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or 
surveillance of communications and the related traffic data by 
persons other than users, without the consent of the users concerned, 
except when legally authorised to do so in accordance with Article 
15(1) [of the DPEC].”82 Art. 15(1) of the DPEC enables Member 
States to “adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the rights 
and obligations provided for in Article 5,83 Article 6,84 Article 8(1),85 
(2), (3), (4), and Article 986 of this Directive when such restriction 
constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure 
within a democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e. State 
security), defence, public security, and the prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised 
use of the electronic communication system, as referred to in Article 
13(1) of [the Data Protection] Directive 95/46/EC.”87 
2.  Article 6 on Traffic Data 
Traffic data relating to subscribers and users would need to be 
erased or made anonymous when it is no longer needed for 
transmission of the communication.88 In the case of marketing 
electronic communications services or for the provision of value 
added services,89 a VoIP provider could continue to process traffic 
 
 82. DPEC, supra note 2, art. 5(1). 
 83. See id. (providing for the confidentiality of communications). 
 84. See id. art. 6(1) (stating that public communications network providers 
must erase traffic data relating to subscribers and users or make the information 
anonymous when no longer needed by the provider to transmit the 
communication). Article 2(b) defines “traffic data” as “any data processed for the 
purpose of the conveyance of a communication on an electronic communications 
network or for the billing thereof .” Id. art. 2(b). 
 85. See id. art. 8 (covering the presentation and restriction of calling and 
connected line identification of users). 
 86. See id. art. 9 (providing that location data may only be processed 
anonymously or with the consent of the users). This is a new provision introduced 
under the DPEC. 
 87. Id. art. 15(1) (emphasis added). 
 88. See id. art. 6(1). 
 89. See id. art. 2(g) (defining “value added service” as a “service which 
requires the processing of traffic data or location data other than traffic data 
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data relating to subscribers/users if the subscriber/user has consented. 
The user/subscriber can withdraw his/her consent at any time.90 
3.  Article 4 on Technical and Organizational Measures 
The providers of a publicly available ECS would need to take 
“appropriate technical and organisational measures to safeguard the 
security of its services.”91 Examples could include measures 
protecting users from viruses or denial-of-services attacks.92 Art. 4(2) 
however, enables providers of publicly available ECS to inform 
subscribers of particular risks to breaches of security of the network  
“where the risk lies outside the scope of the measures to be taken by 
the service provider, of any possible remedies.”93 
In the context of VoIP, one of the main questions to consider is the 
security of communications when users connect their terminals (be it 
PDAs or handheld PCs) to a public telephone network such as a 
WIFI hotspot. Open networks are not secure and therefore, users 
should generally use some form of encryption software (WEP for 
example) to protect the privacy of their communications between 
their laptop and the WIFI hotspot. However, if personal information 
is being uploaded or downloaded on a user’s laptop, then the 
question is to what extent is a provider of the public electronic 
communications required to ensure the privacy of communications of 
a user’s laptop when the user connects to the provider’s WIFI 
hotspot?94 
Art. 4 of the DPEC requires a provider of a publicly available ECS 
to take “appropriate technical and organisational measures to 
 
beyond what is necessary for the transmission of a communication or the billing 
thereof . . .”). Examples of value added service include “route guidance, traffic 
information, weather forecasts and tourist information” that could be provided to a 
user or subscriber. Id. Recital 18. 
 90. See id. art. 6(3). 
 91. Id. art. 4(1). 
 92. See European Commission, supra note 50,  § 5.5.1. 
 93. DPEC, supra note 2, art. 4(2). 
 94. See Compliance and Privacy. Wi-Fi: Are You Broadcasting Personal Data? 
http://www.complianceandprivacy.com/News-Wi-Fi-broadcast-insanity.asp (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2007) (noting that anyone nearby with access to the same network 
could access a user’s PC unless some basic security is in place, such as, a firewall, 
password-controlled access, or end data encryption). 
GARRIE-WONG-AUTHOR CHECK.DOC 4/10/2007  1:17:17 PM 
2007] REGULATING VOIP 119 
safeguard security of its services,”95 but this provision should also be 
read in the light of Art. 17 of the DPD, which requires that data 
controllers “implement appropriate technical and organizational 
measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful 
destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or 
access, in particular where the processing involves the transmission 
of data over a network, and against all other unlawful forms of 
processing.”96 
It should also be added that a user could also be regarded as a data 
controller97 within the DPD if he or she processes personal data on 
his/her laptop and therefore, the privacy of communications is not 
solely the responsibility of the network or VoIP provider. There are 
principally two areas of concern that needs to be discussed. First, 
defining the line between VoIP services provided over a broadband 
network that is operated by another Internet service provider and 
VoIP services where the VoIP provider has control over the 
broadband network. The distinction is important because in the 
former case, it could be contended that network integrity should be 
maintained by the Internet service provider whilst the VoIP provider 
would need to ensure the confidentiality of communications between 
users over this network. In the latter example, it could easily be 
identified that the VoIP provider has control over the network and 
thus, can ensure the integrity of communications. Art. 4(1) of DPEC, 
however, clearly provides that in protecting network security, the 
provider of a publicly available ECS may need to work with the 
provider of the public communications network to achieve this.98 
Therefore, preserving network integrity may have to be 
accomplished jointly between an Internet service provider and a 
VoIP provider.99 
 
 95. DPEC, supra note 2, art. 4(1). 
 96. DPD, supra note 3, art. 17(1). 
 97. See id. art. 2(d). 
 98. See DPEC, supra note 2, art. 4(1) (establishing that “[t]he provider of a 
publicly available electronic communications service must take appropriate 
technical and organisational measures to safeguard security of its services, if 
necessary in conjunction with the provider of the public communications network 
with respect to network security. Having regard to the state of the art and the cost 
of their implementation, these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate 
to the risk presented”) (emphasis added). 
 99. Cf. In an Ofcom survey, some respondents have emphasised that no VoIP 
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A second area of concern that is likely to arise is the possibility of 
unsolicited phone calls (often referred to as Spam over internet 
telephony (“SPIT”))100 transmitted through VoIP. Whether SPIT will 
become a prevalent concern, like e-mail spam, is not entirely clear, 
but in a recent consultation by the U.K. NRA, Ofcom some 
respondents have taken the view that anti-SPAM/SPIT mechanisms 
are being developed to deal with this type of problem.101 
However, even though SPIT mechanisms are being developed, 
arguably, the current framework under the DPEC is more directed 
towards the traditional public telephone switch network. For 
example, the provision on unsolicited communications under Art. 
13(3) requires the prior consent of subscribers in the context of 
automatic calling machines, fax and electronic mail. The requirement 
of prior consent does not necessarily apply to telephone marketing or 
unsolicited calls to users through VoIP; the latter is covered under 
Art. 13(3) of the DPEC. This provision enables Member States to 
determine the measures for unsolicited communications by means 
other than automated calling machines, fax and e-mail.102 
 
service provider has   control over all aspects of the network and that a VoIP 
provider could only reasonably be expected to deliver network integrity over the 
elements that it controls. See, e.g., Internet Telephony Services Providers’ 
Association [ITSPA], Regulation of VoIP Services 2, 23 (2006), 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/voipregulation/responses/itspa.pdf. 
 100. See Ofcom, supra note 61, at 75. 
 101. See ITSPA, supra note 99, at 21; see also Celeste Biever, Move over Spam, 
Make Way for “Spit”, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 24, 2004, available at 
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn6445; Posting of Bruce Schneier to 
Schneier on Security, Combating Spam,  
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/05/combating_spam.html (May 13, 
2005); Ben Charny, Net Phone Customers Brace for ‘VoIP Spam’, CNET NEWS, 
Aug. 23, 2004,  
http://news.com.com/Net+phone+customers+brace+for+VoIP+spam/2100-
7352_3-5302988.html; Eyeball Networks, Eyeball AntiSPITTM Server, 
http://www.eyeball.com/products/anti_spit_server.html (last visited Mar. 15, 
2007). 
 102. See DPEC, supra note 2, art. 13(3) (“Member States shall take appropriate 
measures to ensure that, free of charge, unsolicited communications for purposes 
of direct marketing, in cases other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 [of 
Art. 13], are not allowed either without the consent of the subscribers concerned or 
in respect of subscribers who do not wish to receive these communications, the 
choice between these options to be determined by national legislation.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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A further point to add is that there are lists (telephone preference 
systems)103 whereby individuals can subscribe if they do not want to 
be contacted by marketing companies, but presently, no lists exist in 
the context of VoIP for individuals who do not want to be contacted 
using VoIP. Whilst it should be noted that SPIT is still relatively 
new, it is unclear how much of a risk this will be for users.104 
Whether there should be a blacklist against potential telemarketers in 
VoIP is another question, but some VoIP providers such as Skype 
and Yahoo105 have facilities to enable users to block certain callers. It 
remains to be seen whether SPIT is likely to pose a significant risk 
for users. 
4.  Article 9 on Location Data 
In the case of location data,106 processing of such data relating to 
users or subscribers is permitted with their consent or can only be 
processed when this data is made anonymous or in the case of 
providing a value added service,107 could only be used with the 
consent of the users or subscribers.108 This provision is probably 
 
 103. See, e.g., Telephone Preference Service, Welcome to TPS Online, 
http://www.tpsonline.org.uk/tps/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2006) (describing the 
“Telephone Preference Service” (TPS) which allows end-users to limit access of 
their telephone number and prevent access by certain organizations and other 
solicitors). 
 104. See Schneier, supra note 101. 
 105. See Yahoo! UK & Ireland, Regulation of VoIP Services: Statement and 
Further Consultation 6 (2006), 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/voipregulation/responses/yahoo.pdf, at 
Ques. 25 (providing a Yahoo! Messenger with BT Communicator service which 
enables customers to block communication from senders on their “ignore” list). 
 106. See DPEC, supra note 2, art. 2(c) (defining the term “location data” as “any 
data processed in an electronic communications network, indicating the geographic 
position of the terminal equipment of a user of a publicly available electronic 
communications service . . .”). For example, a computer, mobile phone or a 
personal digital assistant revealing the location of a user via such equipment would 
thus qualify as “location data” under Art. 2(c) of the DPEC. See also Linda 
Ackerman, James Kempf & Toshio Miki, Wireless Location Privacy: Law and 
Policy in the US, EU and Japan (2003), available at 
http://www.isoc.org/briefings/015/index.shtml. 
 107. See DPEC, supra note 2, art. 2(g). 
 108. See id. art. 9 (stating for location data other than traffic data “[t]he service 
provider must inform the users or subscribers, prior to obtaining their consent, of 
the type of location data other than traffic data which will be processed, of the 
purposes and duration of the processing and whether the data will be transmitted to 
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more relevant when considering PDAs, handheld PCs or even cell 
phones that uses VoIP services. 
5.  Article 13 on Unsolicited Communications 
As discussed earlier, this provision was introduced to deal with the 
problem of spam.109 Prior/opt-in consent of subscribers is required 
when unsolicited communications are sent using automated calling 
systems, e-mails and faxes.110 However, in the case of existing 
customers, a natural and legal person may send unsolicited 
communications by e-mail on an opt-out basis.111 
6.  Article 15 on Data Retention 
A controversial provision, which was subsequently approved by 
the European Parliament. According to the latter part of Art. 15(1), 
“Member States may, inter alia, adopt legislative measures providing 
for the retention of data for a limited period justified on the grounds 
laid down in this paragraph [15(1)].”112 This provision should be read 
in the light of a recent Data Retentions Directive 2006/24/EC,113 
which was enacted to deal with the retention of certain data. Art. 1(1) 
 
a third party for the purpose of providing the value added service”). 
 109. See Lilian Edwards, Articles 6–7; Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Directive 2002: Canning the Spam and Cutting the Cookies: Consumer Privacy 
Online and EU Regulation, in THE NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR E-COMMERCE IN 
EUROPE 46 (2005). 
 110. See DPEC, supra note 2, art. 13(1) (“The use of automated calling systems 
without human intervention (automated calling machines), facsimile machines 
(fax) or electronic mail for the purposes of direct marketing may only be allowed 
in respect of subscribers who have given their prior consent.”) (emphasis added). 
 111. See id. art. 13(2) (“[W]here a natural or legal person obtains from its 
customers their electronic contact details for electronic mail, in the context of the 
sale of a product or a service, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, the same 
natural or legal person may use these electronic contact details for direct marketing 
of its own similar products or services provided that customers clearly and 
distinctly are given the opportunity to object, free of charge and in an easy manner, 
to such use of electronic contact details when they are collected and on the 
occasion of each message in case the customer has not initially refused such use.”). 
 112. Id. art. 15(1). 
 113. See Council Directive 2006/24, On the Retention of Data Generated or 
Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic 
Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks and Amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54 (EC). 
GARRIE-WONG-AUTHOR CHECK.DOC 4/10/2007  1:17:17 PM 
2007] REGULATING VOIP 123 
of the Data Retentions Directive expressly provides the main 
objective. Namely, to 
harmonise Member States’ provisions concerning the 
obligations of the providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications 
networks with respect to the retention of certain data which 
are generated or processed by them, in order to ensure that 
the data are available for the purpose of the investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by 
each Member State in its national law. 114 
Data is stored between a minimum of six months to two years.115 
For internet telephony, Member States can postpone the application 
of the retention of communications data relating to Internet 
telephony until March 2009.116 The main categories of data that 
could be retained are data necessary to trace and identify the source 
of a communication,117 data necessary to identify the destination of a 
communication,118 data necessary to identify the date, time and 
 
 114. Id. art. 1(1) (emphasis added). 
 115. See id. art. 6 (“Member States shall ensure that the categories of data 
specified in Article 5 are retained for periods of not less than six months and not 
more than two years from the date of the communication.”). 
 116. See id. art. 15(3) (“Until 15 March 2009, each Member State may postpone 
application of this Directive to the retention of communications data relating to 
Internet Access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail. Any Member State that 
intends to make use of this paragraph shall, upon adoption of this Directive, notify 
the Council and the Commission to that effect by way of a declaration. The 
declaration shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.”) 
(first emphasis added). Some Member States, however, have postponed the 
application of Art. 15(3) for a shorter period. For example, Austria and Germany 
have postponed the application of the provision on the retention of 
communications data relating to Internet access, Internet telephony and Internet e-
mail for 18 months after 15 September 2007. Id. Declaration by Austria and 
Germany. 
 117. See id., art. 5(1)(a). In the context of internet telephony, Member States 
shall ensure “the user ID and telephone number allocated to any communication 
entering the public telephone network” and “the name and address of the 
subscriber or registered user to whom an Internet Protocol (IP) address, user ID or 
telephone number was allocated at the time of the communication” are retained. Id. 
art. 5(1)(a)(2). 
 118. See id. art. 5(1)(b) (asserting that in the context of internet telephony, 
Member States shall ensure the retention of “the user ID or telephone number of 
the intended recipient(s) of an Internet telephony call” and “the name(s) and 
address(es) of the subscriber(s) or registered user(s) and user ID of the intended 
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duration of a communication,119 data necessary to identify the type of 
communication,120 and data necessary to identify users’ 
communication equipment or what purports to be their equipment.121 
As expressly stated under Art. 5(2) of the Data Retentions 
Directive,122 data revealing the content of the communications are not 
covered.123 
Although these provisions expressly provide the need to trace the 
user, the key difficulty that arises is tracing the origin of the calls that 
are made. In a recent article on VoIP,124 Warren describes the main 
problems with VoIP from a law enforcement perspective. 
The problem with VoIP, from law enforcement perspective, 
is that it does not travel through an exchange. There is no 
simple way to catch the packets travelling over the internet, 
or even to link the 12-digit internet ‘IP addresses’ between 
which a call travels online to any two people. Wireless 
routers can generate a one-time IP address that can be 
pinpointed to the wireless router, but—as in the case of a 
wireless hotspot—that will show only that the call was made 
from that router.125 
Indeed, the problem of tracing calls is made more difficult with the 
use of wireless phones, wireless-enabled smart phones and PDAs 
that could make calls from any unlocked domestic wireless access 
point. The Data Retentions Directive goes some way to make it 
mandatory for VoIP providers to retain data relating to users, but 
 
recipient of the communication”). 
 119. See id. art. 5(1)(c) (indicating that in the context of internet telephony, 
Member States will ensure the retention of “the date and time of the log-in and log-
off of the Internet access service, based on a certain time zone, together with the IP 
address, whether dynamic or static, allocated by the Internet access service 
provider to a communication, and the user ID of the subscriber or registered user” 
and “the date and time of the log-in and log-off of the Internet e-mail service or 
Internet telephony service, based on a certain time zone”). 
 120. See id. art. 5(1)(d). 
 121. See id. art. 5(1)(e)(3). 
 122. Id. art. 5(2). 
 123. See id. Recital 13 (providing that the Directive applies to “data generated or 
processed as a consequence of a communication or a communication service and 
does not relate to data that are the content of the information communicated”). 
 124. Peter Warren, Lifting the Veil on Internet Voices,  GUARDIAN (London), 
July 27, 2006, at Technology 1. 
 125. Id. 
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whether users can be sufficiently identified or with any degree of 
certainty is not entirely clear. 
D.  CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK 
To summarize, the European framework126 should be regarded as 
an important milestone for regulating and clarifying (though not 
exclusively) the provision of VoIP services, yet major questions still 
arise over the current classification of VoIP services, such that not all 
VoIP providers would be considered PATs and therefore the 
obligation to PATs providers would not apply to non-PATs VoIP 
providers such as peer-to-peer VoIP providers. Thus, there is no 
uniformity in the legal obligations that exist for VoIP providers. As 
for the privacy of communications, this is principally covered under 
the DPD and DPEC. The main areas that need to be addressed (albeit 
at a European level) are the public/private network distinction drawn 
under the DPEC, the preservation of network integrity between a 
broadband service provider and the Internet service provider as 
covered under Art. 4 of the DPEC, spam over Internet telephony, and 
tracing the origin of the caller. 
 
 126. At the time of writing, the European Commission is currently reviewing the 
electronic communications framework with amendments anticipated to take place 
starting in 2009. In the context of privacy, the main changes include an explicit 
obligation under Art. 4(1) of the DPEC between electronic communications 
networks providers and electronic communications service providers to co-operate 
in ensuring data security. The discussion of the changes are beyond the scope of 
this article, but a good starting point would be the European Commission 
Information Society Website, Roadmap for the Reform of the EU’s Telecom Rules,   
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/roadmap/index_e
n.htm#implementation_report, (last visited Mar. 15, 2007); Hogan & Hartson LLP 
& Analysys, Final Report for the European Commission, Preparing the Next Steps 
in Regulation of Electronic Communications: A Contribution to the Review of the 
Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework (July 2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/info_centre/studies_ext
_consult/next_steps/regul_of_ecomm_july2006_final.pdf. 
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IV.  U.S. FRAMEWORK127 
In 1928, Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead v. United States,128 
anticipated that technological advancement would enable the 
Government to employ surveillance tools extending far beyond 
wiretapping.129 In that dissenting opinion, 
Justice Brandeis asserted that Fourth Amendment protections 
must be interpreted broadly to safeguard against new abuses 
that were not previously envisioned. Thus, Brandeis sought to 
protect the individual’s ‘right to be let alone’ without regard 
to the different technologies that might be employed by the 
Government to compromise that right. Justice Brandeis’ 
forward looking focus on individuals’ underlying privacy 
interests presents a more compelling perspective than the 
premise of the Wiretap Act as currently applied by the 
courts.130 
Since Katz v. United States,131 courts have routinely forbidden 
third parties from tapping or monitoring oral communications. 
However, they just as routinely permit business to track, store and 
sell data packets transmitted in the same way with the implied or 
explicit consent of either party engaged in the transmission. The 
digital age and its VoIP causes the distinction between voice and 
data made in the law to become muddled in the digital age.132 
With the convergence of oral and data into a single transmission 
medium, the courts, [like computers], are unable to distinguish 
between oral and data communications. The use of the VoIP and 
Similar technologies has made this legal distinction impossible to 
 
 127. The U.S. use of VoIP telecommunication technologies is maturing and 
several of the issues discussed above in the European section have not been heard 
by the U.S. courts. 
 128. 277 U.S. 438, 472–74, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. See generally Daniel B. Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong & Donald P. 
Harris, Voice Over Internet Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation 
Protected?, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97 (2005) (examining Voice Over Internet 
Protocol communications and whether Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Street Act of 1968 [Wiretap Act] applies to this new type of communication). 
 130. Garrie, Armstrong & Harris, supra note 129,  at 100. 
 131. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the wiretapping of a public telephone 
booth violated the Fourth Amendment and constituted a search and seizure). 
 132. Garrie, Armstrong & Harris, supra note 129, at 100. 
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uphold because oral and electronic data communications now travel 
over the same wires simultaneously, encapsulated in digital data 
packets.133 
A.  TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS ARE PROTECTED FROM 
GOVERNMENTAL PRIVACY INVASIONS 
The courts have found telephone communications protected from 
governmental privacy invasions in two principal ways.134 First, 
parties to a voice conversation are entitled to a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” under the Supreme Court opinion of Katz v. 
United States.135 Second, the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968 prevents 
unauthorized third-party interceptions of telephone communications, 
unless the interceptor is in possession of a court order or either of the 
involved parties in the communication have provided their 
consent.136 The Katz opinion explains the rationale behind the 
Supreme Court’s oft-quoted statement that the Fourth Amendment 
“protects people, not places,”137 and concludes that an entity’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy must be protected from 
government searches.138 The Federal Wiretap Act was Congress’ 
 
 133. Id. at 100–01. 
 134. See Frierson v. Goetz, 227 F. Supp. 2d 889, 896–97 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) 
(describing a two-part test for determining qualified immunity). “First, courts must 
decide whether the alleged constitutional or statutory violations were ‘clearly 
established’ at the time of the alleged violations.” Id. at 896. Second, the court 
decides “‘whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have 
known that his or her actions violated clearly established rights.’” Id. at 896–97 
(quoting Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003, 1008 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
 135. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that when 
in a phone booth, “a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation 
of privacy” and that “electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in 
this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment”). The Katz 
Court suggests that a man who enters a phone booth and closes the door behind 
him reasonably expects that his conversation will not be overheard. Id. at 352. 
 136. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521 (2004). 
 137. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect what a person wittingly or deliberately exposes to the public but does 
protect anything a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public”). 
 138. See id. at 353 (holding that the government's actions “violated the privacy 
upon which [petitioner] justifiably relied,” and thus triggered Fourth Amendment 
protections). However, it is unclear how the recent action by the Bush 
administration respective to wiretapping will be interpreted by the Supreme Court 
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response to the Katz opinion and was an attempt to prevent 
electronic surveillance of oral telephone communications without a 
court order.139 
The Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Katz eliminated the idea 
that property rights governed a person’s right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.140 Katz stands for the proposition 
that an individual can control which of his actions and information is 
accessible by the public,141 and what remains private and protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.142 The Katz doctrine of Fourth 
Amendment protections has a twofold requirement: first, a person 
must exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, that 
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.143 While the courts have read Katz narrowly in recent 
years,144 and the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections only 
insulate individuals from governmental privacy encroachments,145 
 
under the context of National Security interplaying with the constitutionally 
granted rights of the executive privilege. 
 139. See United States v. Andonian, 735 F. Supp. 1469, 1471 (C.D. Cal. 1990); 
S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 38, 46–47 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2112, 2153, 2162–63. 
 140. See 389 U.S. at 353 (discrediting the notion that a court must find a 
“trespass,” and clarifying that no physical intrusion need occur to implicate Fourth 
Amendment protections). 
 141. See id. at 351 (holding that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected”). 
 142. See id. at 351–52 (alluding to the fact that while the public could see 
petitioner using the telephone, Petitioner’s actions in closing the door to the booth 
indicated his intent to prevent the public from hearing his conversation). 
 143. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 144. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case For Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 852 
(2004) (stating that “despite Berger and Katz, courts have proved surprisingly 
reluctant to find that the occasional holes in the Wiretap Act violate the Fourth 
Amendment”). Moreover, “wiretapping law may be constitutional in theory, but it 
is statutory in practice . . . [w]hen wiretapping occurs inside the United States, 
courts generally refuse to construe the Fourth Amendment as going beyond the 
scope of the Wiretap Act.” Id. at 855. 
 145. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613 (1989) 
(stating that “[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or 
seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative, the 
Amendment protects against such intrusions if the private party acted as an 
instrument or agent of the Government”); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 
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the Wiretap Act is the main cause of action protecting telephone 
communicants from non-governmental third-party interceptors.146 
Telephone communicants can obtain redress under the Wiretap Act 
for unauthorized third party interceptions of telephone 
communications unless the interceptor has a court order147 or the 
consent of either party involved in the conversation.148 
 While Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act (hereinafter “Wiretap Act”) initially afforded 
extensive protection to wire communications, oral 
communications were protected only when there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Because the legislation 
covered both face-to-face oral communications and 
traditional point-to-point wired communications, courts were 
faced with myriad interpretive difficulties. To correct the 
problems with Title III, Congress amended the Wiretap Act 
by passing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986 (ECPA). Congress designed the ECPA to prohibit the 
intentional interception of oral, wire, and electronic 
communications. Because Congress was concerned with 
advancements in electronic technology that would be capable 
of defeating any privacy expectations, the ECPA enacted a 
strict set of standards for the interception of oral, wire, and 
electronic communications. Congress further expanded the 
protection of wireless communication by passing the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 
1994 (CALEA), which extended Title III to the radio portions 
of cellular and cordless phones. In the wake of September 11, 
2001, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act). 
The Patriot Act contained a number of important changes to 
Title III that expanded the government’s ability to conduct 
surveillance. 
 
U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (stating that “[t]he overriding function of the Fourth 
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted 
intrusion by the State”). 
 146. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2521. 
 147. See id. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (noting that a written certification from an 
individual authorized under the statute also will suffice, but both the order and 
certification must specify the duration, information to be gathered, and facilities to 
be used). 
 148. See id. § 2511(2)(d). 
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. . . . 
 In  the existing judicial environment, it is not clear whether 
VoIP communications will receive similar judicial treatment 
as oral telephone communications or whether they will be 
treated as Internet based electronic communications. The 
Wiretap Act’s protective provisions apply equally to oral, 
wire, and electronic communications. In practice, however, 
courts have permitted the interception of Internet electronic 
communications under the Wiretap Act more than 
interceptions of oral telephone communications because (1) 
corporate web portals using clickstream technology 
frequently consent to the interception of end-user data for 
purposes of data mining, whereas telephone users rarely 
consent to third-party interceptions of telephone 
conversations; (2) end-users are more likely to consent to 
interceptions of Internet electronic communications in return 
for increased online functionality than they are when 
engaging in traditional telephone conversations; and (3) 
Internet electronic communications are more likely to be 
stored on an end-user’s computer, making them fair game for 
third-party interceptors, since the Wiretap Act only applies to 
communications intercepted contemporaneously with 
transmission.149 
Therefore, the U.S. framework is currently in a state of flux and is 
not able to disambiguate the existing statutory language with regards 
to VoIP oral communication technologies. 
The issue gets even more complicated with the expansive reach of 
globalization. For instance, what if a user in the United States uses a 
VoIP line that goes thru Europe while being routed to a peer within 
the United States and a third party intercepts the transmission in 
Canada and is not a U.S. citizen?150 The U.S. courts do not have a 
 
 149. Garrie, Armstrong & Harris, supra note 129, at 114, 120–21 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 150. The network over which the call is transmitted can be a few feet or 
thousands of miles. See Washington Exch. Carrier Ass'n v. LocalDial Corp., Final 
Order Granting Motions for Summary Determination, Dkt. No. UT-031472 at 11 
(Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n June 11, 2004) (“For a call from Seattle to 
Spokane or from Olympia to Bellingham, this whole process of converting the call 
from TDM to IP and back to TDM again occurs in the room at the Westin 
Building.”) 
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clear answer151 and there is no clear state or federal regulatory 
response.152 Thus, the average U.S. consumer using a VoIP phone for 
their conversations has little recourse against a foreign third-party 
interceptor of their conversation. The consumer might be able to 
assert a cause-of-action against the U.S. VoIP provider, depending of 
course on the circumstances, but it is not clear whether such a suit 
would be successful. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As identified in the paper, the regulatory framework for VoIP 
services both in the European Union and the United States is 
beginning to emerge. In the European Union, VoIP services are 
principally covered under the new regulatory framework for 
electronic communications. In the context of privacy of 
communications, this is dealt with under the DPD 153 and the 
DPEC.154 In the United States, VoIP services are not covered by 
explicit regulatory bodies to VoIP communications; however, and 
unlike in Europe, the scope of privacy still remains ambiguous and 
unresolved in the United States. The main areas of concern that need 
to be addressed at a global level (Europe and the United States) 
include the issue of spam over Internet telephony, network integrity 
shared between a VoIP provider and the Internet service provider, 
 
 151. See, e.g., Ben Charny, Minnesota: Phone Rules Apply to VoIP, CNET 
NEWS, Aug. 21, 2003, available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104_2-
5066652.html; Ashley H. Grant, Judge: Internet Phone Regulation Could Slow 
Net's Expansion, USA TODAY.COM, Oct. 17, 2003, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-10-17-netphone-ruling-
logic_x.htm; W. David Gardner, Minnesota Judge: VoIP is Unregulated Data, 
TECHWEB, Oct. 8, 2003, 
http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20031008S0017. 
 152. See In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the 
Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 
F.C.C. 2d 267, ¶¶ 27, 31–38 (Mar. 18, 1971) (final decision and order); see also In 
re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer 
and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C. 2d 291, ¶¶ 39–45 (Apr. 3, 
1970) (tentative decision); In the Matter of a Study of Voice over Internet Protocol, 
Case No. TW-2004-0324, Order Establishing Case (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 
3, 2004), http://www.psc.mo.gov/teleco/VOIP_Order.pdf. 
 153. See DPD, supra note 3. 
 154. See DPEC, supra note 2. 
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and caller identification under VoIP (such as tracing the origin of the 
caller). 
While the higher expectation of privacy afforded to non-Internet 
oral communications by the U.S. Constitution155 and the Wiretap 
Act’s prohibition of unauthorized third-party interceptions of oral 
telephone and electronic communications,156 neither the U.S. federal 
courts nor legislatures have acted to explicitly protect VoIP oral 
Internet communications;157 in fact, as technology is evolving with 
respect to VoIP and oral Internet communications it is becoming 
progressively greyer and complex in both arenas. 
In order to ensure that oral communications utilizing VoIP 
technology will enjoy the same treatment and protection under the 
law as their non-VoIP oral communication counterparts, the courts 
and the legislature must act. They must either explicitly recognize 
the legislative privacy distinction between digital data and other oral, 
wire and electronic communications irrespective of the issue of 
consent158 or the courts must halt all use of data mining technology 
 
 155. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that 
electronically listening to telephone conversations constitutes a “search and seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”) with United States v. Hambrick, 
55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999) (concluding that “[c]yberspace is a 
nonphysical ‘place’ and its very structure, a computer and telephone network that 
connects millions of users, defies traditional Fourth Amendment analysis”). 
 156. See United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that a 
violation of the Act required that interception occur contemporaneously with 
transmission); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (“any person who—(a) intentionally 
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or 
endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral or electronic communication . . . shall be 
punished . . . or shall be subject to suit . . .”); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 
90 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 
(1984) (“The sanctity of the home is not to be disputed.”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 
(declaring that use of electronic eavesdropping equipment to overhear conversation 
inside telephone booth intrudes on legitimate expectation of privacy); City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(describing body and home as areas “ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth 
Amendment protection”). 
 157. See Garrie, Armstrong & Harris, supra note 129. 
 158. See In re DoubleClick, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In 
re Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1278 (C.D. Cal. 2001); In re Toys R Us, No. 00-
CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); Chance v. 
Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1160–62 (W.D. Wash. 2001). In each case, 
the court held that no unlawful interception had occurred because, even if the 
transmission to the third party constituted an “interception” of the user's 
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and wait for Congress to deliver a legislative solution.159 A 
Congressional amendment would provide courts a new legal 
framework in which to analyze VoIP claims brought under the 
Wiretap Act, enabling them to differentiate between data 
transmissions and other oral, data, and electronic transmissions. 
Without Congressional action and court application, VoIP 
technology remains at risk of unauthorized access and mining, which 
threatens the free communication of us all. The other possible 
solution, which is beginning to occur already is for each State to act 
independently of the federal government; however, given the 
complex legal issues, this approach is neither ideal nor likely to be 
effective in remedying the situation of VoIP communications in the 
United States. 
 
communications with the Web site, it was done with the consent of the Web site, 
which was a party to the communication. But see In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 
9, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that there was no consent under the Wiretap Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2004), where a corporate entity had an explicit agreement 
prohibiting a third-party from collecting personal identifiable information). 
 159. See Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 21–22. 
